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Section 1983 Wrongful Death and Survival Actions in the 
Seventh Circuit: An Indiana Litigant’s Guide to Claims 
After Russ v. Watts 
MICHELLE R. GOUGH 
INTRODUCTION 
The availability of survival and wrongful death damages in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
cases is an area that involves both changing precedent and unaddressed issues 
within the Seventh Circuit.1 In both of the aforementioned types of claims, the 
cases will necessarily involve the tangled application of both state and federal law, 
and the Seventh Circuit and other federal courts of appeals have struggled to 
provide a clear, coherent approach to these issues. Indeed, there is strong 
disagreement among the circuits.2 Dean Steven H. Steinglass offered the most 
comprehensive discussion of the nature of both types of claims under § 1983 in 
Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, which was published in the Indiana Law 
Journal in 1985.3 However, a subsequent shift in precedent in the Seventh Circuit 
has significantly impacted the nature and availability of claims under the 
circumstances giving rise to wrongful death and survival claims.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 
   Associate Instructor, Indiana University School of Education. J.D., Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law; B.A., DePauw University. The author wishes to thank 
James L. Whitlatch and Eric J. McKeown for comments, criticism, and suggestions on this 
Article. 
 1.  Survival and wrongful death claims may be pursued in the context of § 1983 when 
the behavior that infringed upon the constitutional rights of an individual also led to the 
individual’s death or when a decedent has passed with a pending § 1983 claim but whose 
death was unrelated to the state action. 
 2.  See infra notes 66, 85–91 and accompanying text. 
 3.  Steven H. Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L.J. 559 
(1985) [hereinafter Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions]. Dean Steinglass also offered a less 
detailed discussion of these concepts in a two-part article, Steven H. Steinglass, 
Circumventing the State Limitation in Sec. 1983 Wrongful-Death Claims, NAT’L L.J., June 9, 
1986, at 20 [hereinafter Steinglass, State Limitation]. More recently, in 2003, Steinglass 
joined Professor Martin A. Schwartz, Richard Emery, Esq., and Ilann Margalit Maazel, Esq. 
for a roundtable on wrongful death claims and § 1983, which was moderated by the 
Honorable George C. Pratt and included comments by Professor Erwin Chemerinsky and the 
Honorable Victor Marrero. Martin A. Schwartz, Steven Steinglass, Richard Emery & Ilann 
Margalit Maazel, Roundtable Dialogue, Wrongful Death Actions Under Section 1983, 19 
TOURO L. REV. 707 (2003). For discussion of the circuit split regarding parental liberty rights 
in the § 1983 wrongful death context, see Ilann Margalit Maazel, Wrongful Deaths Cases: 
Substantive Due Process Claims, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 10, 2007, at 3; Meir Weinberg, Note, The 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right of Companionship Between a Parent and His or 
Her Adult Child: Examination of a Circuit Split, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 271 (2009); Isaac J.K. 
Adams, Note, Growing Pains: The Scope of Substantive Due Process Rights of Parents of 
Adult Children, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1883, 1884–85 (2004). 
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The shift in the Seventh Circuit began when the court overruled Bell v. 
Milwaukee by Russ v. Watts in 2005, and the effects of Russ have extended far 
beyond the claims of Indiana litigants.4 Steinglass described Bell as “the leading 
federal court of appeals § 1983 wrongful death case.”5 After its decision in Russ, 
the Seventh Circuit is now, in some respects, on the other side of a circuit split.6 
While this role is signified as federal courts in other circuits address Bell and Russ,7 
the extent of the Russ v. Watts8 holding remains unclear. 
This Article provides an updated discussion of the contours for wrongful death 
and survival claims asserted under § 1983 by Indiana claimants proceeding in the 
Seventh Circuit for damages when a loved one dies as the result of a state actor’s 
behavior that violated § 1983 or when a loved one dies with a pending § 1983 
claim.9 Where the precedent is unclear or has not reached an issue, I will 
acknowledge the lack of clear guidance and explain the most tenable solution under 
the existing precedent and through reference to the relevant scholarly literature. 
Thus, this Article strives to be both a pragmatic and theoretical discussion for 
Indiana litigants pursuing these claims in federal court through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 4.  See Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005), overruling Bell v. City of 
Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 5.  Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions, supra note 3, at 631; see also id. at 631 n.424 
(stating that “Bell has become the starting point in the analysis of § 1983 wrongful death 
actions” and citing to the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits; the federal district court in 
Colorado; and a state court in Louisiana).  
 6.  See Russ, 414 F.3d at 783.  
 7.  See McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 828–29 (3d Cir. 2003); Michael D. Moberly, 
For Whom Bell Tolls: A Decedent’s Right to § 1983 Pain and Suffering Damages in the 
Ninth Circuit, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 409, 409 n.† (2000) (discussing wrongful death and 
section 1983 in the Ninth Circuit generally and noting, “[w]ith deference to Ernest 
Hemingway, the title reference is to Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 
1984), which has been characterized as the ‘leading § 1983 wrongful death case’ by one 
Ninth Circuit court analyzing the issue discussed in this article”); Sarah E. Ricks, Evolution 
of a Doctrine: The Scope of the Parental Liberty Interest Protected by Substantive Due 
Process After McCurdy, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 138 (2005).  
 8.  See Russ, 414 F.3d at 788 (surveying sister circuits that have precedent in contrast 
to the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Bell). 
 9.  For a thorough discussion of § 1983 litigation, see MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & 
KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed. 2008). See 
also 1B MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES §§ 13.01–
.04 (4th ed. 2010) (the 2003 edition of this treatise was recently cited by the Seventh Circuit 
in Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Servs., 577 F.3d 816, 826 (7th Cir. 2009)).  
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I. WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL CLAIMS IN THE CONTEXT OF § 1983 
Neither wrongful death nor survival claims grow out of the common law, and 
neither of the claims are directly available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10 Under the 
common law, claims abated at death; however, over time wrongful death and 
survival actions developed under state statutes to remedy the harsh common law 
rule.11 Following the United States Supreme Court decision in Monroe v. Pape,12 
litigants increasingly began to pursue these claims in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.13 
Enacted by Congress, § 1983 provides a right of action to individuals who have 
been deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws” by state action.14 The Supreme Court has established that § 1983 does 
not create substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for already established 
rights.15 However, survival and wrongful death claims become available in federal 
§ 1983 claims through the application of § 1988.16 Federal courts fill in the 
deficiencies of the remedies available under § 1983 by applying state laws that 
create survival actions so long as the state law is not inconsistent with the policies 
underlying § 1983.17  
The Supreme Court articulated the rule under which we borrow states’ survival 
statutes in Robertson v. Wegmann in 1978.18 In Robertson, Clay Shaw filed a § 
1983 claim four years prior to his death. At the time of his death, trial over the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 10.  For additional discussion of the development of state remedies to the common law 
rule that required abatement of claims upon death, see Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions, 
supra note 3, at 564–65. 
 11.  See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (“State statutes governing 
the survival of state actions do exist . . . . These statutes . . . were intended to modify the 
simple, if harsh, 19th-century common-law rule: ‘[A]n injured party’s personal claim was 
[always] extinguished . . . upon the death of either the injured party himself or the alleged 
wrongdoer.’” (quoting Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 n.14 (1973))); 
Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) 
(“[W]rongful death actions are in derogation of common law.”). 
 12.  365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 13. Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions, supra note 3, at 563–64. 
 14.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 15.  See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617–18 (1979). 
 16.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
 17.  Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978) (“As we noted in Moor v. 
County of Alameda, and as was recognized by both courts below, one specific area not 
covered by federal law is that relating to ‘the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 
upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.’ State statutes governing the survival of 
state actions do exist, however. . . . Under § 1988, this state statutory law, modifying the 
common law, provides the principal reference point in determining survival of civil rights 
actions, subject to the important proviso that state law may not be applied when it is 
‘inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.’” (citation and footnotes 
omitted)). 
 18.  Id. at 588. 
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claim had not yet begun.19 The issue before the Court was whether the federal court 
should look to the Louisiana state rule regarding survivorship, in which case the 
claim would abate because Shaw died with no surviving relatives that would align 
with the requirements of the state survivorship statute, or whether the federal 
district court “was free instead to create a federal common-law rule allowing the 
action to survive.”20 The Court held that the claim abated under the Louisiana state 
law because the estate’s executor did not fall within those specified by the 
survivorship statute.21 However, in the process, the Court established a procedure 
for using § 1988 to fill in the gaps by looking to the state law and then determining 
whether the state law was consistent with the underlying policy of § 1983.22 If the 
policies of § 1983 are not inconsistent, then the federal court may apply the state 
law. Accordingly, under the facts of the case, Robertson was limited to survival 
claims and did not address wrongful death claims. To date, the Supreme Court has 
not addressed the availability of wrongful death claims under § 1983, which allows 
room for disagreement among the circuits.23 
II. INDIANA WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL ACTS 
As held in Robertson, the federal courts may look to state statutes to fill in the 
holes for damages recoverable under § 1983 as long as those statutes do not 
conflict with the policies behind § 1983.24 Indiana has enacted two different articles 
potentially applicable to families of the deceased who pursue litigation for harms 
suffered by the decedent or for their own harms: Wrongful Death25 and Survival.26 
Under Indiana law, wrongful death and survival actions are distinct. Wrongful 
death actions include claims by relatives of the decedent to recover for their own 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 19.  Id. at 585. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 590–91. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at § 13.01–.04; SWORD AND SHIELD: A PRACTICAL 
APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 60 (Mary Massaron Ross & Edwin P. Voss, Jr. eds., 
3d ed. 2006); infra note 93. 
 24.  For additional discussion about the history and legislative intent of 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, see Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions, supra note 3, at 645–54. 
 25.  See IND. CODE § 34-23 (2008) (Wrongful Death Generally, Adult Wrongful Death, 
and Wrongful Death or Injury of a Child). Indiana actually has three separate causes of 
action for wrongful death: the general wrongful death statute (“GWDS”), the adult wrongful 
death statute (“AWDS”), and the child wrongful death statute (“CWDS”). For discussion of 
these three statutes and disagreement over the availability of attorney’s fees under the 
ADWS, see Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Brown, 934 N.E.2d 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2010) (holding that attorney’s fees are available under the AWDS) and McCabe v. 
Commissioner, Indiana Department of Insurance As Administrator of Indiana Patient’s 
Compensation Fund, 930 N.E.2d 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that attorney’s fees are 
not available under the AWDS). 
 26.  See § 34-9-3 (Survival of Cause of Action After Death of Party). 
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injuries caused by the death of their loved one;27 in contrast, survival actions are 
based upon the decedent’s own individual claims that he would have been entitled 
to file for his own injuries.28 Under the statutes that create the actions, both claims 
are circumscribed such that only plaintiffs who fall under the specified relationship 
chain may proceed under the claim, and such plaintiffs may only seek the damages 
specified in the statute.29 
Distinguishing the claims is crucial when assessing their availability and 
applicability at both the state and federal levels. When discussing the Indiana 
wrongful death statute in a state action, the Indiana Court of Appeals explained, 
“[T]he statute creating this right of action must be strictly construed. . . . [O]nly 
those damages prescribed by statute may be recovered. . . . This statute was not 
created to compensate for the loss of life of the decedent.” 30 
In Ellenwine v. Fairley, the Indiana Supreme Court described that the Indiana 
Survival Act  
sets forth a series of rules dictating when particular claims or causes of 
action may and may not be brought by or against the representative of 
the deceased party. Sections 1 and 4 of the Survival Act provide that if 
an individual who has a personal injury claim or cause of action dies, 
the claim or cause of action does not survive and may not be brought 
by the representative of the deceased party unless the individual dies 
from causes other than those personal injuries.31 
As illustrated by Ellenwine, Indiana law does not allow survival claims in state law 
cases where the personal injuries that form the basis of the claim are also alleged to 
have led to the death of the individual. Indiana state law has the additional 
limitation that “[a] defendant may be held liable under a Wrongful Death claim or a 
Survival claim, but not both.”32  
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 27.  See § 32-23-1-1. 
 28.  See § 34-9-3-1.  
 29.  §§ 32-23-1-1, 34-9-3-1. 
 30.  Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1991). 
 31.  Ellenwine v. Fairley, 846 N.E.2d 657, 660–61 (Ind. 2006) (citing §§ 34-9-3-1, -4; 
Kohn v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 966 F.Supp. 789, 791 (N.D. Ind. 1997); Goleski v. 
Fritz, 768 N.E.2d 889, 891–92 (Ind. 2002)) (emphasis added).  
 32.  Baumgart ex rel. Baumgart v. Defries, 888 N.E.2d 199, 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 
But cf. infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
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III. SEVENTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT REGARDING WRONGFUL DEATH AND  
SURVIVAL CLAIMS IN § 1983 LITIGATION 
A. Survival Claims 
Following Robertson, district courts considering survival claims in the Seventh 
Circuit have drawn from applicable state laws but found that § 1983 supersedes 
aspects of applicable state laws that conflict with the policies of the federal 
statute..33 For litigants whose claims invoke the Indiana Survivorship statute, this 
has meant applying the statute with the exception of the two restrictions mentioned 
in Section II: the prohibition of survival claims when the personal injuries that form 
the basis of the claim are also alleged to have led to the death of the individual, and 
the prohibition that defendants may not be held liable under both a wrongful death 
claim and a survival claim.34  
These aspects of the Indiana statutes are not given effect because, as indicated 
by the Court in Robertson, state law restrictions do not apply if they are 
inconsistent with the policies behind § 1983.35 The two main policies of § 1983 
litigation are compensation and deterrence.36 Both of the Indiana statutory 
limitations cease to apply in § 1983 claims because they are inconsistent with the 
policies behind § 1983.37 In the context of the chapter of the survival statute that 
prohibits recovery when a victim dies, the policies behind § 1983 warrant 
overriding the statutory limitation because it makes it “more advantageous to the 
unlawful actor to kill rather than injure.”38 Similarly, prohibiting a survival action 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 33.  See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 34.  See id.; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, § 13.03[D], at 13-26 n.97 (“Dictum in 
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 142 (1988), states that state statutory limits on monetary 
recovery are preempted by § 1983 because ‘partial immunities inconsistent with section 
1983 must yield to the federal right.’ Application of this principle to wrongful death claims 
substantiates the conclusion that state limits on wrongful death recovery may not be applied 
to § 1983 claims.”). 
 35.  Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 585 (1978). 
 36.  Id. at 590–91 (“The policies underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons 
injured by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting 
under color of state law.”) (emphasis added); Bell, 746 F.2d at 1239 (“[T]he fundamental 
policies behind Section 1983 are twofold: compensation for and deterrence of 
unconstitutional acts committed under state law.”) (emphasis added); see also Steinglass, 
Wrongful Death Actions, supra note 3, at 659. 
 37.  See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590 (“[S]tate law may not be applied when it is 
‘inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
1988)). See Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions, supra note 3, at 561, for a discussion of the 
“tensions inherent in the incorporation of state law to fill gaps in the § 1983 cause of action 
when it is often the inadequacy of state law that influenced plaintiffs’ choice of federal 
remedies in the first place.” See also SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, § 13.03[D], at 13-26 n.97. 
 38.  Bell, 746 F.2d at 1238; see Moberly, supra note 7, at 428; Steinglass, Wrongful 
Death Actions, supra note 3, at 635; see also O’Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional 
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when there are related wrongful death claims fails to compensate all of the 
individuals whose rights have been abrogated and also lessens the deterrent effect. 
An additional change between Indiana state survival actions and § 1983 claims that 
borrow the Indiana survival statutes is that federal courts have allowed claimants to 
provide hedonic evidence to establish damages in survival claims.39 Highlighting 
the differences for litigating such claims in state versus federal court, testimony 
regarding hedonic value was held to be inadmissible in the Indiana case Southlake 
Limousine & Coach, Inc. v. Brock.40 
B. Wrongful Death Claims 
While Indiana state law prohibits litigants from recovering for both survival and 
wrongful death claims, as noted in the preceding section, this state law limitation 
does not apply in the context of § 1983.41 However, there is disagreement among 
the circuits as to whether plaintiffs may claim wrongful death damages under § 
1983.42 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the split and referenced the other 
circuits’ stances in the Russ opinion.43  
                                                                                                                 
 
Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1981) (“After Robertson and Carlson, . . . state 
law governs the survivability of § 1983 actions, but a federal rule of survival supersedes any 
state law requiring abatement in an action where the acts of the defendants caused the death 
of the injured party.”); Moberly, supra note 7, at 440–43 (discussing overlap of policy in 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 
and § 1983 claims, and quoting O’Connor). 
 39.  See Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988); see also White v. Gerardot, No. 
1:05-CV-382, 2008 WL 4724000, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 24, 2008) (“Now that White has 
conceded that she is not seeking hedonic damages or damages for loss of love and 
companionship, this evidence has little if any probative value . . . .”); Susan Poser, Brian H. 
Bornstein & E. Kiernan McGorty, Measuring Damages for Lost Enjoyment of Life: The 
View from the Bench and the Jury Box, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 53–68 (2003). For 
discussion of hedonic damages in the context of civil settlements, see John Bronsteen, 
Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Essay, Hedonic Adaptation and the 
Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (2008). 
 40.  578 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
 41.  See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
 42.  Compare Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 
1983 is personal to the victim, and only he, “or his estate’s representative(s), may prosecute 
a section 1983 claim; conversely, no cause of action may lie under section 1983 for 
emotional distress, loss of a loved one, or any other consequent collateral injuries allegedly 
suffered personally by the victim’s family members”), with Kelson v. City of Springfield, 
767 F.2d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that parents had a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in the companionship and society of their fourteen-year-old son and stated 
claim under § 1983 against school officials after their son committed suicide while at 
school), construed in Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 43.  See Russ, 414 F.3d at 787–88 (surveying sister circuits that have precedent in 
contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Bell, including Trujillo v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 768 F.2d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 1985); Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 
6, 9 (1st Cir. 1986); McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2003); Claybrook v. 
Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2000); and Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 804–05 
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1. Bell v. City of Milwaukee 
In 1984, the Seventh Circuit decided Bell v. City of Milwaukee and issued a 
lengthy and influential opinion regarding decedents’ family members’ pursuits of 
wrongful death and survival claims under § 1983.44 Bell was an “extraordinary” 
case involving allegations by family members that police officers unlawfully 
deprived Daniel Bell of his life following a foot chase and then conspired to 
conceal the facts surrounding Bell’s death.45 The court broke the claims down into 
four categories all alleged as compensable under § 1983:  
First, (a) Daniel Bell’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 
violated in the excessive use of force by Grady in the chase, and (b) his 
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in the unlawful killing. . . . 
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment rights of Daniel’s father Dolphus 
Bell were infringed by the unlawful killing; specifically, the father 
allegedly possessed a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the 
continued association of his child. . . . Third, Daniel’s siblings proffer a 
Fourteenth Amendment theory similar to that of the father’s estate . . . . 
Fourth, . . . defendants . . . conspired to conceal the facts of the shooting 
and killing, [and] the conspiracy interfered with their ability to pursue 
their claims . . . [and] deprived them of their due process and equal 
protection rights . . . .46  
The damages claimed by Bell’s father and siblings were loss of society and 
companionship.47 The Seventh Circuit held that the Federal Constitution entitled 
parents of an adult victim to recover for loss of society and companionship in a § 
1983 action where the decedent died as a result of unconstitutional actions taken 
under color of law, but the court held that the Federal Constitution does not confer 
such a right on siblings.48 However, in 2005, the court reexamined Bell in Russ v. 
Watts and explicitly overturned the Bell holding regarding the availability of such 
incidental claims by parents of adult children who are victims of § 1983 
infringements.49  
                                                                                                                 
 
(4th Cir. 1994)); see also Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2006), aff’d, 
553 U.S. 507 (2008) (construing Russ as “discussing when other circuit opinions might 
present a compelling reason to overrule circuit precedent”). 
 44.  Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled by Russ v. 
Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005). For discussion of the influence of Bell in the Third 
Circuit before McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2003), see Ricks, supra note 7. For a 
similar discussion of the Ninth Circuit, see Moberly, supra note 7. See generally Adams, 
supra note 3, at 1884–85 (starting the article with Bell); Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions, 
supra note 3, at 631 n.424. 
 45.  Bell, 746 F.2d at 1214. 
 46.  Id. at 1224. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 1247. 
 49.  Russ, 414 F.3d at 783. 
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2. Russ v. Watts 
Russ involved claims arising from the death of twenty-two-year-old Robert 
Russ, a Northwestern University student, who was fatally shot by a Chicago police 
officer.50 Russ’s family sued under § 1983 for loss of society and companionship, 
citing Bell.51 The Seventh Circuit was thus presented with the opportunity to 
reconsider Bell’s holding that the “parent’s constitutional liberty interest in his 
relationship with his adult son was violated when his son was killed by police.”52 
Here, the Seventh Circuit indicated that § 1983 wrongful death actions cannot be 
maintained by parents of an adult child unless the behavior of the state actors was 
“for the specific purpose of terminating [the decedent’s] relationship with his 
family.”53  
In the Russ opinion, the court described how its “sister circuits have considered 
whether the Constitution protects a parent’s relationship with his adult children in 
the context of state action which has the incidental effect of severing that 
relationship.”54 Then the court noted that most of the other circuits had “expressly 
declined” to find that a constitutional liberty interest had been violated in this 
context when the state action did not specifically target severing that relationship.55 
The court expressed concern that “[a]ffording plaintiffs a constitutional due process 
right to recover against the state in these circumstances would create the risk of 
constitutionalizing all torts against individuals who happen to have families.”56 The 
court next described how courts should cautiously proceed when determining 
whether an asserted right or an asserted liberty interest should receive constitutional 
protection.57 
In the analysis of the asserted liberty right itself, the court initially broached the 
topic of the complicated landscape regarding the analysis of due process claims. 
However, while quoting the analyses from Washington v. Glucksberg, County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, and Troxel v. Granville, the court then tossed those 
complications aside in one sweeping comment58:  
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 50.  Id. at 783.  
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 790.  
 54.  Id. at 787. 
      55.    Id. But cf. Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that children may assert Fourteenth Amendment claim via § 1983 for unwarranted state 
interference with parent-child relationship and describing Ninth Circuit precedent holding 
that parents may “challenge under section 1983 a state's severance of a parent-child 
relationship as interfering with their liberty interests in the companionship and society of 
their children”), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
 56.  Russ, 414 F.3d at 790. 
 57.  See id. at 789 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).  
 58.  Id. (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21; County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
U.S. 833, 846 (1998); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72–73 (2000)). For discussion of the 
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In deciding this case, we need not resolve the issue of precisely what 
level of scrutiny should apply to allegations of government interference 
with the parental liberty interest. Under any standard, finding a 
constitutional violation based on official actions that were not directed 
at the parent-child relationship would stretch the concept of due process 
far beyond the guiding principles set forth by the Supreme Court.59  
The Seventh Circuit stated that the precedent upon which the Bell decision had 
relied “all dealt with the right to procreate and make decisions about rearing one’s 
minor children without state interference” rather than a constitutional liberty 
interest in a parent’s relationship with his adult child.60 Further, the court 
characterized the relied-upon precedent as all involving state action that 
“purposefully interfered with the family relationship.”61  
Russ explicitly overruled Bell and prohibited the plaintiffs’ claims in the second 
to last paragraph. The court explained that the claimants did not allege that the state 
action was for the purpose of severing Russ’s familial relationship.62 The court then 
commented that allowing these claims creates a risk of “constitutionalizing all torts 
against individuals who happen to have families.”63 Ultimately, the court expressly 
overruled Bell, stating, “We therefore overrule our decision in Bell insofar as it 
recognized a constitutional right to recover for the loss of the companionship of an 
adult child when that relationship is terminated as an incidental result of state 
action.”64 This language suggests that claimants seeking wrongful death claims 
must allege and provide evidence that the action targeted the relationship itself. 
However, the court also included a statement that muddies the water, at least in the 
context of minor children: “although we need not impose an absolute rule that 
parents of adult children lack any liberty interest in their relationship with their 
children, we agree with our sister circuits that minor children’s need for the 
                                                                                                                 
 
due process standards following Glucksberg, see Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg 
Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH L. REV. 409 
(2006). 
 59.  Russ, 414 F.3d at 789–90. But cf. Struck v. Cook Cnty. Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 
858, 859 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he plaintiff does have a claim on his own behalf—that the 
guardian is preventing him from seeing his mother and by doing so is depriving him of 
liberty protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, liberty that he 
argues includes the right of an adult child to associate with his parent. Whether the argument 
has merit . . . remains an open question in this circuit. We need not try to answer it in this 
case.” (citations omitted)); Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 2006) (“We 
suggested in Russ v. Watts that parents and adult children have some constitutionally 
protected interest in being able to associate with each other.” (emphasis in original) (citation 
omitted)). 
 60.  Russ, 414 F.3d at 790. 
 61.  Id. (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981); Smith v. Org. of 
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 854–56 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972)). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 791.  
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guidance and support of their parents warrants ‘sharply different constitutional 
treatment.’”65 
Thus the Russ holding is based upon either one or both of the following factors: 
(1) that the claimants did not allege “intentional action by the state to interfere with 
a familial relationship,” and (2) that Russ was not a minor child.66 What Russ 
leaves unclear is twofold: (1) whether there exists a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest for parents to associate with their adult children,67 and (2) whether 
such claims exists for and/or by minor children and spouses,68 and if so, the 
requirements of such claims.69 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FAMILIAL INTERESTS AFTER RUSS 
This Article now proceeds to look at Seventh Circuit cases following Russ, with 
the aim of determining whether the court has since fleshed out the issues left 
unclear by Russ. I consider whether there is a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest for parents of adult children, as well as the contours of wrongful death 
claims in § 1983 claims on behalf of and for the death of a minor child or spouse. 
Where the Seventh Circuit has not made determinations on these issues, this Article 
attempts to form the most appropriate resolution. I will begin with a review of 
Seventh Circuit precedent following Russ that has characterized the holding. Then, 
I will look to the other circuits, with emphasis on those that Russ referenced. 
Finally, I will propose a resolution to both issues that recognizes the constitutional 
dimensions of these relationships while also responding to the concern for not 
expanding the availability of wrongful death claims beyond what the Constitution 
and § 1983 require. 
A. Seventh Circuit Post-Russ Precedent 
The Seventh Circuit has continued to apply the Russ rule generally without yet 
addressing the issues left unclear by the opinion. Since the opinions that discuss 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 65.  Id. at 790 (quoting Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 656 (D.C. Cir. 
2001); McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 829 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  For discussion of the circuit split on this issue, see Adams, supra note 3; Weinberg, 
supra note 3. 
 68.  See infra note 114 and accompanying text (stating that spouses, like minor children, 
have a recognized protected liberty interest). 
 69.  For discussion of the open issue of whether a constitutional right exists for an adult 
child-parent relationship when the relationship is targeted, see Struck v. Cook Cnty. Pub. 
Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 859 (7th Cir. 2007); Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 
2006) (“We suggested in Russ v. Watts that parents and adult children have some 
constitutionally protected interest in being able to associate with each other.” (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted)). For discussion of the minor-child issue as still open, see supra 
note 60 and accompanying text. 
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Russ are few, it is both worthwhile and manageable to look at each individually and 
as part of a larger picture of the Seventh Circuit’s stance on these claims. 
1. Jones v. Brennan—August 2006 
Jones v. Brennan involved claims by an adult daughter against various probate 
judges, guardians, and lawyers involved in probate proceedings of her father’s 
estate for allegedly depriving her of property in the probate proceedings without 
due process of law.70 The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court for 
further “probing” of whether any of the claims were outside the scope of the 
probate exception.71 The court acknowledged that the complaint included the 
federal claim of a constitutional familial interest and characterized Russ as having 
“suggested . . . that parents and adult children have some constitutionally protected 
interest in being able to associate with each other.”72 
2. Thompson v. City of Chicago—December 2006 
In Thompson v. City of Chicago, a decedent’s wife and mother pursued 
wrongful death claims under § 1983 because Thompson’s death was the alleged 
result of unconstitutional state action.73 A jury trial resulted in a judgment for the 
defendant police officer and city.74 While the court upheld the district court on 
other grounds, the court included a note in the opinion that stated,  
[I]t is worth noting that their § 1983 claim was properly dismissed. The 
Thompsons predicate their argument in this respect on this court’s 
decision in Bell . . . . However, Bell has been expressly overruled by 
Russ . . . . In Russ, we . . . concluded that “finding a constitutional 
violation based on official actions that were not directed at the parent-
child relationship would stretch the concept of due process far beyond 
the guiding principles set forth by the Supreme Court.” Accordingly, as 
in Russ, Thompson’s mother and wife do not have standing to pursue a 
§ 1983 action . . . , as they have not even alleged that Thompson was 
killed “for the specific purpose of terminating [Thompson’s] 
relationship with his family.”75 
3. Henning v. O’Leary—February 2007 
Henning v. O’Leary involved claims by Garrett Henning’s parents and daughter 
after his death was caused by police officers who shot and killed him during his 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 70.  Jones, 465 F.3d 304.  
 71.  Id. at 308–09. 
 72.  Id. at 308 (emphasis added). 
 73.  472 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 74.  Id. at 446. 
 75.  Id. at 452 n.25 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
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attempt to escape arrest.76 In upholding the trial court’s judgment that no excessive 
force was used by the officers, the court described the constitutional claims in a 
parenthetical, labeling the argument “a dubious proposition, at least for the 
parents, after Russ v. Watts.”77 It is noteworthy that the Henning opinion 
characterizes only the parents’, and not the minor daughter’s,78 constitutional claim 
as dubious. Further, the opinion cites a case from the Ninth Circuit for comparison 
to Russ, and the Ninth Circuit recognizes a constitutional familial interest 
actionable in § 1983 wrongful death claims.79  
4. Jenkins v. Bartlett—April 2007 
In Jenkins v. Bartlett, the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal from the federal 
district court’s grant of summary judgment on behalf of the defendants in response 
to various § 1983 claims filed by Jenkins following the death of her son who was 
shot and killed by Bartlett, a police officer.80 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court rulings; however, as in Thompson, the court included a note regarding 
the availability of constitutional familial interests. Here, the court stated,  
[o]riginally, Ms. Jenkins also brought claims on behalf of herself and 
Mr. Jenkins’ children for loss of society and companionship. . . . The 
district court . . . granted Officer Bartlett’s motion to dismiss Ms. 
Jenkins’ personal claim for loss of society and companionship 
following our decision in Russ v. Watts, which held that surviving 
parents had no independent constitutional right to recover for loss of 
society and companionship of an adult child incidental to state action.81 
5. Struck v. Cook County Public Guardian—December 2007 
In Struck v. Cook County Public Guardian, an adult son had filed in federal 
court alleging that an Illinois state court had violated his and his mother’s 
constitutional rights by denying his request to revoke his mother’s guardian, who 
had been appointed due to his mother’s incompetency.82 The Seventh Circuit 
upheld the district court’s dismissal for jurisdictional reasons.83 Here again, as in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 76.  477 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 77.  Id. at 495 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 78.  See Henning v. O’Leary, No. 05-C-582-S, 2006 WL 995223, at *1 (W.D. Wis. 
April 14, 2006) (noting that Alyiana was the minor daughter). 
 79.  See Henning, 477 F.3d at 495 (citing Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 
1418–19 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 
F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Moberly, supra note 7.  
 80.  487 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 81.  Id. at 484 n.1 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court noted that the 
children’s claims were dismissed because Ms. Jenkins lacked standing to bring them. Id. 
 82.  508 F.3d 858, 859 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 83.  Id. at 860. 
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Thompson and Jenkins, the court included a note about the plaintiff’s claim 
regarding the guardian’s prevention of him seeing his mother: 
[T]he plaintiff does have a claim on his own behalf—that the guardian 
is preventing him from seeing his mother and by doing so is depriving 
him of liberty protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, liberty that he argues includes the right of an adult child 
to associate with his parent. Whether that argument has merit has split 
the circuits, as explained in Robertson v. Hecksel, but remains an open 
question in this circuit.84 
B. Constitutional Interest for Relationship Between Parents of Adult Children After 
Russ? 
The five cases in which the Seventh Circuit has characterized the Russ holding 
regarding the constitutional parental interest answer the first of the two questions 
identified as having been left unclear by Russ, that is, whether Russ should be 
interpreted to preclude a constitutional interest between a parent and his or her 
adult child. The decisions rendered after Russ indicate that the Seventh Circuit 
considers Russ to have not precluded the potential for a limited right.  
Jones, the first of the opinions to address § 1983 wrongful death issues alleged 
by parents of an adult victim, is the most positive of the cases as the court expressly 
states that such parents have “some constitutionally protected right.”85 Jenkins and 
Thompson avoid commenting on whether such a right exists but indicate that in 
order to proceed a parent must allege that the harm to a potential familial interest 
was not incidental to state action but was targeted by the state action.86 
Comparatively, the Henning opinion characterizes the parents’ wrongful death § 
1983 claims regarding their adult child simply as dubious.87 Finally, Struck did not 
involve wrongful death and/or § 1983 but characterizes the issue of whether there is 
a constitutionally cognizable right between an adult child and his parent as 
remaining “open” after Russ.88  
While the five opinions’ characterizations of Russ indicate that the issue of 
whether such a constitutional right exists remains open, the contours of the 
potential right remain nebulous. What does seem clear from the opinions, 
particularly Jenkins and Thompson, is that whether or not the right exists, in order 
for a parent to allege that the right has been violated in a § 1983 claim, the parent 
needs to be able to allege that the severing of the relationship was targeted by the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 84.  Id. at 859 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 
304, 308 (7th Cir. 2006); Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254, 1258–60 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2005)).  
 85.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
 86.  See supra notes 61, 65 and accompanying text. 
 87.  See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 88.  See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
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state action. In other words, the Seventh Circuit has determined the evidentiary 
requirement for the right without clearly determining whether such a right exists. 
This requirement may severely limit, if not prohibit, the opportunities for 
parents of adult children to recover for the harms that they themselves incur as a 
result of state action that causes the death of an adult child.89 Given the emphasis in 
Russ on the approach of other circuits, it should be noted that the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach of requiring that the state actor target severing the parent-child 
relationship is not an approach to wrongful death and § 1983 that is consistently 
shared among the other circuits.90  
What the Seventh Circuit appears to do is draw from aspects of the various 
circuit positions to which it cited in Russ and the later cases, without adopting the 
full approach of any, to create a unique approach to § 1983 claims asserting 
wrongful death claims. For example, the fact that Russ indicates a requirement that 
actors target the harms, and that the harms not merely be derivative, can be 
interpreted as an attempt to address the holdings in Claybrook and Shaw, which 
represent the views of the Sixth and Fourth Circuits respectively, and hold that 
wrongful death and other derivative rights are flatly unavailable under § 1983 
because § 1983 is personal,91 as well as the approaches of the First, Third, and 
Tenth Circuits that have all created a similar intention requirement.92 However, 
Russ’s comment that minor children should receive different constitutional 
treatment indicates an area in which the Seventh Circuit diverges from the First and 
Third Circuits, which both apply the intention requirement to all claims. At the 
same time, treating minor children differently aligns with the D.C. Circuit.93 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s approach of leaving open whether a parental 
liberty interest exists for adult children is distinct from the First, D.C., Eleventh, 
and Third Circuits as they each have held that a constitutional interest between 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 89.  See Maazel, supra note 3, at 3 (“In McCurdy, because the police officer did not 
have ‘parent-child relationships . . . on [his] mind when he pulled the trigger,’ the 
Substantive Due Process claim failed. Of course this limitation essentially eviscerates the 
claim in wrongful death cases. What police officer would have parent-child relationships on 
his mind?” (alteration in original) (citing McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
But cf. Weinberg, supra note 3, at 297. 
 90.  Requiring that the state actors have an intention to sever the parent-adult child 
relationship has been adopted by the Seventh, Third, and First Circuits. See Adams, supra 
note 3, at 1911.  
 91.  Compare Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788 (7th. Cir. 2005), with Claybrook v. 
Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2000), and Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 804–05 
(4th Cir. 1994). 
 92.  Compare Russ, 414 F.3d at 788, with Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 9 (1st 
Cir. 1986), and McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2003), and Trujillo v. Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm’rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 93.  Compare Russ, 414 F.3d at 788, with Valdivieso Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 9, and McCurdy, 
352 F.3d at 830, and Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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parents and adult children does not exist.94 Finally, the Seventh Circuit differs from 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding that a parental liberty interest does apply in the context 
of adult children and the Tenth Circuit’s holding that the relationship is protected 
under the First Amendment.95  
In summary, the Seventh Circuit’s comment that minor children should receive 
sharply different treatment aligns with parts of the First, Third, and D.C. Circuits’ 
approaches, and the intention requirement aligns with the First, Third, and Tenth 
Circuits’ precedent. However, the Seventh Circuit has not gone as far as the First, 
Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits’ holdings that derivative claims are never 
available under § 1983, not even for spouses or minor children.96 Lastly, the 
Seventh Circuit has distinguished itself by creating a middle ground between the 
the First, Third, and D.C. Circuits which hold that no constitutional parental liberty 
interest applies in the context of adult children, and the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, 
which have recognized a full-bodied constitutionally protected interest for adult 
children, albeit on different grounds. Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s approach to 
wrongful death and § 1983, by which it requires that the state actor target the 
parent-adult child relationship, while leaving the issue of whether a constitutional 
liberty interest exists for parents of adult children and also indicating an interest in 
treating minor children differently, is distinct from each of the other circuits in 
some material respect.97  
V. RESOLUTION 
This Article argues that parents of adult children do have a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest, and that the Seventh Circuit can reconcile its recognition 
of the interest with the various elements of Russ. While the United States Supreme 
Court precedent has not ever directly addressed the parameters of a constitutional 
liberty interest in the context of adult children,98 related precedent supports 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 94.  See, e.g., Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2005); 
McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830; Butera, 235 F.3d at 637; Valdivieso Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 9; see also 
Adams, supra note 3, at 1911.  
 95.  See Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986); Trujillo, 768 F.2d 
at 1188–89 (finding constitutional interest under First Amendment); Adams, supra note 3, at 
1910, 1903 n.141; Weinberg, supra note 3, at 288. 
 96.  The approach of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits differs from that of the First and 
Third. The First and Third Circuits have held that a § 1983 claim may be had in the context 
of a parental liberty interest so long as the disruption to the interest was targeted by the state 
actor and thereby causes the claim to not merely be incidental; however, the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits have indicated that all wrongful death claims are by their nature incidental and 
therefore not available under § 1983. Compare Claybrook, 199 F.3d at 357–58, and Shaw, 
13 F.3d at 804–05, with Valdivieso Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 9, and McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830. 
 97.  In Russ, the Ninth Circuit, which acknowledges a parental liberty interest with adult 
children, is referenced only with a “but see” signal and only regarding minor children. Russ, 
414 F.3d at 788. The Second Circuit is not referenced at all. See id. 
 98.  See Struck v. Cook Cnty. Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 859 (7th Cir. 2007) 
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recognition of this right and references the Ninth and Second Circuits.99 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s post-Russ decisions in Jones and Struck both 
indicate the Seventh Circuit’s inclination to find some constitutional protection for 
this relationship, albeit an interest that is characteristically different than the parent-
minor child liberty interest.100  
The Supreme Court cases cited by Bell and Russ for addressing familial rights 
focused on “the right to procreate and make decisions about rearing one’s minor 
children without state interference.”101 However,  
The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that companionship is a separate 
and distinct aspect of the parental liberty interest. . . . [T]he Stanley [v. 
Illinois] Court included companionship among the constellation of the 
parental liberty interest, and that definition of the interest has been cited 
repeatedly in the Court’s subsequent cases considering the Constitution 
and the family.102  
While care, custody, and control may be specific to minor children and children 
with disabilities, companionship is not so limited.103 The Seventh Circuit would 
thus be well-grounded to hold that the parental liberty interest continues to apply to 
the companionship between a parent and adult child while also holding that such an 
interest is a lesser interest than that shared between a parent and minor child104:  
[A] plurality of the Court has recognized the rights of grandparents to 
live with their grandchildren, at least where those rights do not conflict 
                                                                                                                 
 
(describing the issue as open in Seventh Circuit jurisprudence and therefore necessarily 
indicating that the Supreme Court has not issued an opinion on the subject); SCHWARTZ & 
URBONYA, supra note 9, at 175 (“The Supreme Court has not resolved whether a wrongful 
death claim may be brought under § 1983.”); Maazel, supra note 3 (“The Supreme Court has 
never expressly addressed the issue.”); Adams, supra note 3, at 1902 (“The Supreme Court 
twice had the opportunity to rule on this issue; however, it opted not to do so, holding on 
both occasions that certiorari had been granted improvidently.”).  
 99.  See Maazel, supra note 3. The Tenth Circuit is not mentioned because of its unique 
rationale for finding constitutional protection of the right under the First Amendment. See 
supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 100.  See supra notes 70–72, 82–85 and accompanying text. 
 101.  Russ, 414 F.3d at 790 (citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 165–66 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)); see also McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 
820, 829 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Supreme Court precedent indicates that the parental 
liberty interest is limited to “the right of parents to make critical child-rearing decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of minors”). 
 102.  Adams, supra note 3, at 1920 (footnote omitted) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57, 66 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 
U.S. 246, 247 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
 103.  See Adams, supra note 3, at 1921–22. 
 104.  See id. at 1922–25. Adams proposes a two-tiered approach towards the parental 
liberty interest that lessens as the child approaches “the point where the child possesses the 
full gamut of his constitutional liberties.” Id. at 1923. 
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with those of the children’s parents. If a grandparent has a liberty 
interest in the companionship of a grandchild, it would make little sense 
for a parent not to have a liberty interest in the companionship of an 
adult child.105  
Such an approach not only aligns with the common sense perception that a parent’s 
role in the care and custody of his or her children lessens as they reach adulthood, 
but it may also be justified by the reasoning that as the child him/herself develops 
the full range of constitutional rights by reaching adulthood, these rights would 
conflict with the parent’s similar rights and thus the parent’s rights should yield.106 
While a care and custody interest would conflict with the adult child’s own liberty 
interest, the companionship interest would not.107 At the same time, in the context 
of children with disabilities for whom a parent’s care, custody, and control extends 
into adulthood, the full parental interest would still attach.108 Accordingly, while 
establishing a clear and manageable rule, the approach is consistent with the tone of 
Russ and Jones that indicates an inclination by the Seventh Circuit to find some 
constitutional protection,109 is responsive to Russ’s comment that the parental 
liberty interest should receive different treatment in the context of minor children 
than adult children, and also addresses the unique needs of the special 
circumstances present with disabled children.  
Additionally, finding a less full-bodied liberty interest for parents of adult 
children than that afforded for parents of minor children enables the Seventh 
Circuit to apply a more stringent test (that the state actor specifically targeted the 
relationship) to § 1983 claims alleging harms to parents’ relationships with their 
adult children than that applied in wrongful death claims involving minors and 
spouses in which the full liberty interest is implicated.110  
VI. § 1983 WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES FOR AND BY MINOR CHILDREN AND 
SPOUSES AFTER RUSS. 
Although Russ did not involve claims by a spouse, Robert Russ had conceived a 
child months before his death, and the child had been proven to be his through 
DNA testing after birth.111 However, the federal action, as opposed to the state 
action in which the estate to which Russ’s minor son was the sole heir and received 
a verdict of $9.6 million, did not involve claims by Russ’s minor child. 
Accordingly Russ provides little guidance for § 1983 claims for harms to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 105.  Maazel, supra note 3 (citations omitted). 
 106.  Id. at 1924. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 1923–25. 
 109.  See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text for this aspect of Russ and notes 69–
72 and accompanying text for this aspect of Jones.  
 110.  See Niehus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d 526, 532 (7th Cir. 1992); infra note 115. 
 111.  Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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parental liberty interest in the context of minor children. Additionally, since Russ 
was unmarried, the opinion does not provide guidance for spousal claims. 
However, that a constitutionally protected liberty interest exists in the family 
relationships of spouses and parents and minor children is well-grounded in 
precedent.112 And, Russ fully acknowledges that liberty interest and references it as 
partial grounds for overruling Bell by stressing that while the precedent does 
protect the parental liberty interest under the due process clause, Bell was distinct 
from the scope of those decisions because of the decedent’s adult-child status.113 
Thus, the questions raised by Russ are not about the scope of the liberty interest for 
minor children and spouses but the contours of recovering for harms to these liberty 
interests in the context of wrongful death under § 1983.  
As mentioned in the preceding Part, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Russ cites 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Shaw v. Stroud and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Claybrook v. Birchwell, as well as the First and Third Circuits’ decisions in 
Valdivieso Ortiz and McCurdy.114 Citing to these cases is significant because the 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that wrongful death damages are unavailable 
even in the context of minor children and spouses because § 1983 is a personal 
action. Similarly, the First and Third Circuits have both held that all wrongful death 
claimants must show that the state action targeted the disruption to the 
relationship.115 Thus, if citation to these cases indicates the Seventh Circuit’s 
intended adoption of their approaches, the Seventh Circuit would severely restrict 
litigants from recovering wrongful death damages in the context of § 1983, even 
when the claims involve the constitutionally protected familial liberty interests of 
minor children and spouses.  
This was the interpretation suggested by the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana when it addressed claims for interference with familial 
relations asserted under § 1983 in Estate of Perry ex rel. Perry v. Boone County 
Sheriff.116 In response to the plaintiff’s assertion that Russ left open the door for 
wrongful death claims regarding minor child victims to § 1983 infringements, the 
court stated, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 112.  For discussion of the liberty interest in the relationship between parents and minor 
children, see supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 13–
24 n.89 (citing Supreme Court cases’ recognition of parents’ constitutional rights to raise 
children). For discussion of liberty interests recognized for spouses as actionable under § 
1983, see Niehus, 973 F.2d at 532 (“There would be no novelty in interpreting ‘liberty’ to 
embrace the right of sexual companionship in marriage. The Supreme Court has placed the 
freedom to marry in the firmament of liberties protected by the due process clause . . . .”). 
For the liberty interest in the relationship of the nuclear family, see id. at 533 (“The 
relationships that define the nuclear family—relationships that for many people are 
constitutive of their very identity—are protected, as we have seen . . . .”). 
 113.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 114.  Russ, 414 F.3d at 787–88. 
 115.  See supra note 91, 93, and accompanying text 
 116.  No. 1:05-cv-1153-LJM-WTL, 2008 WL 694696 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 2008). 
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First, it is doubtful whether a substantive claim for interference with 
familial relations even exists under § 1983. The Russ court was 
certainly careful not to explicitly recognize such a right, and this Court 
is unaware of any current decision of the Seventh Circuit recognizing 
such a right. In fact, at least one Circuit Court has rejected such an 
argument. In doing so, the [Fourth Circuit] noted that the Supreme 
Court “has never held that the protections of substantive due process 
extend to claims based on governmental action which affects the family 
relationship only incidentally.” Indeed, that the Supreme Court would 
recognize such a right where the effect is merely incidental seems 
unlikely given that it has held that negligent infliction of harm is not 
actionable under § 1983.117 
However, this Article takes the position that the “sharply different . . . 
treatment” language in the second-to-last paragraph of Russ is one of several 
indications that it was not the intention of the Russ opinion to apply the same rule 
to minor children and spouses as it applied with parents of adult children, and that 
the result in Russ would have likely been otherwise if Robert Russ had a been a 
minor child.118 The Henning decision also supports that the Seventh Circuit 
considers the constitutional claims of a minor child to have more protection.119 
Further, affording different treatment to minor children to allow enable litigants to 
pursue wrongful death claims in the context of spouses and children would align 
with other circuits that have held § 1983 can be used to compensate for and deter 
state actors from causing harms to the constitutionally protected familial interests in 
these contexts.120 
As indicated in the discussion regarding the Seventh Circuit’s requirement that 
claimants must allege that the state action targeted the disruption of the familial 
interest, such a requirement would in practice deny wrongful death recovery in 
most, if not all, § 1983 claims.121 If the two policy goals of § 1983 are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 117.  Id. at *12 (emphasis added) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 
(1986); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 805 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
 118.  See Russ, 414 F.3d at 787 (“Since Bell, several of our sister circuits have considered 
whether the Constitution protects a parent’s relationship with his adult children in the 
context of state action which has an incidental effect of severing that relationship.” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 790 (“Our finding of a constitutional violation in Bell was not 
appropriately moored to Supreme Court precedents establishing the contours of the parental 
liberty interest. The decisions on which we relied . . . all dealt with the right to procreate and 
make decisions about rearing one’s minor children . . . .” (emphasis added)); supra note 54 
and accompanying text. 
 119.  See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 120.  See Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418–19 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on 
other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999); SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 9, at 13-29 nn.102–05 (describing precedent from the Ninth and Second Circuits 
that has allowed wrongful death claims asserted by children for loss of parent in § 1983); see 
also Trujillo v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 121.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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compensation and deterrence of these constitutional violations, the intention 
standard does not serve the policy goals. Rather than compensating for the harms 
and deterring conduct, this intention standard insulates state actors from 
accountability for these types of injuries.122  
While the Russ opinion applies the intention standard when parents of an adult 
child pursue wrongful death claims under § 1983, the Seventh Circuit can and 
should recognize the liberty interest present in minor child and spousal familial 
relationships and afford such relationships greater protection by modifying the 
intention requirement. First, the requirement could simply be dropped in the 
context of full familial liberty interests.123 The second manner through which the 
familial liberty interest could be given effect in wrongful death claims in § 1983 is 
through the common law transferred intent doctrine that the Seventh Circuit has 
applied in other § 1983 claims involving derivative constitutional harms caused to 
family members.124 In Niehus, the Seventh Circuit indicated that application of the 
transferred intent doctrine is limited “to the greater deprivations” of a liberty 
interest.125 While that discussion was in the context of explaining why Bell was 
distinct from the lesser consortium interest alleged by the plaintiff, the same logic 
applies here. Only, now Bell represents the lesser liberty interest, that in the context 
of parents of adult children, for which the transferred intent doctrine may not be 
utilized to apply § 1983, and cases involving the full familial liberty interests of 
spouses and minor children represent for which the transferred intent doctrine may 
be utilized. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has described the current state of Survivorship and Wrongful Death 
actions under § 1983 in the Seventh Circuit. While Survivorship claims have 
become relatively settled, Wrongful Death actions continue to be the source of 
changing and unclear precedent along with a split among the circuits. This Article 
has focused on two issues that remain unclear in the Seventh Circuit in the contest 
of wrongful death claims asserted under § 1983 following the decision in Russ v. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 122.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 123.  See Maazel, supra note 3 (describing the most recent Second Circuit case on this 
issue) (“Although the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ conduct ‘was intentionally 
directed at his family,’ the court went out of its way to note that ‘this Circuit has never held 
that a challenged action must be directed at a protected relationship for it to infringe on the 
right to intimate association’ and that such a strict standard finds no support ‘in any of our 
precedents.’” (citing Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2002))). 
 124.  See Niehus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d 526, 533 (“But the common law doctrine of 
transferred intent protects the holding of Bell from attack based on Daniels. If A aims at B, 
and hits C, C can sue A for battery, even though he was not the intended victim and even 
though battery is an intentional tort. C can of course still sue A if A hits B as well as C. The 
plaintiff in a survivor’s wrongful-death suit is C, the decedent B, the defendant A—so here 
Mr. Niehus is B, Mrs. Niehus is C, and the defendants are A.” (citation omitted)). 
 125.  Id. at 534. 
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Watts to overrule Bell v. Milwaukee: whether the relationship between a parent and 
an adult child is a constitutionally protected liberty interest, and the availability of 
Wrongful Death claims for minor children and spouses. Through a review of 
United States Supreme Court precedent regarding the liberty interest, precedent 
within the Seventh Circuit, and reference to other circuits, this Article has proposed 
that the most appropriate resolution of the parental liberty interest with an adult 
child is to find a lesser parental liberty interest in the parent-adult child 
relationship. By finding a lesser liberty interest, the Seventh Circuit may apply a 
more stringent test of requiring a showing that the state actor intended to disrupt the 
parental relationship in the adult child context and yet apply a less stringent test in 
§ 1983 claims involving minor children and spouses, where the full liberty interest 
is involved. This approach appropriately serves the compensation and deterrence 
policies behind § 1983 when the full liberty interest is at stake and also provides a 
theoretically consistent method of tailoring the circumstances in which such claims 
may be pursued and by whom.  
